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TITLE 25
FRAUD
Chapter
1. Fraudulent Conveyances [Repealed].
2. Sale of Merchandise in Bulk [Repealed].
3. Leases and Sales of Livestock [Repealed].
4. Marketing Wool [Repealed].
5. Statute of Frauds.
6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.

CHAPTER 1
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 59, § 16.)

25-1-1 to 25-1-16. Repealed.
Repeals. - Laws 1988, ch. 59, § 16 repeals
§§ 25-1-1 to 25-1-16, Utah Code Annotated

§ 1, relating to fraudulent conveyances, effective April 25, 1988. For present comparable
provisions, see Chapter 6 of this title.

1953, as last amended by Laws 1987, ch. 195,

CHAPTER 2
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)

25-2-1 to 25-2-5. Repealed.
Repeals. - Sections 25-2-1 to 25-2-5 (L.
1923, ch. 92, §§ 1 to 5; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-2-1 to 33-2-5), relating to sale of merchan-

dise in bulk, were repealed by Laws 1965, ch.
154, § 10-102. For present provisions, see
§ 70A-6-101 et seq.

CHAPTER 3
LEASES AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)

25-3-1 to 25-3-4. Repealed.
Repeals. - Sections 25-3-1 to 25-3-4 (L.
1917, ch. 52, §§ 1 to 4; C.L. 1917, §§ 130 to
133; L. 1921, ch. 3, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,

33-3-1 to 33-3-4), relating to leases and sales of
livestock, were repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154,
§ 10-102.
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CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)

25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed.
Repeals. - Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L.
1931, ch. 54, §§ 1 to 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-4-1 to 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of

wool, were repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154,
§ 10-102.

CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.

Section
25-5-6.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in
lands.
Certain agreements void unless
written and subscribed.
Representation as to credit of third
person.

25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

Promise to answer for obligation of
another - When not required to
be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974,
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 33-5-1.
Cross-References. - Contract for sale of
goods for $500 or more unenforceable in absence of some writing, § 70A-2-201.

Enforceability

§ 70A-9-203.

of

security

interests,

Securities sales, statute of frauds for contracts, § 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal property not otherwise covered, § 70A-l-206.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Defenses to action on contract.
Easements.
Gifts.
"Interest in real property."
Leases.
Modifications of contract.
Mortgages, and estates or interests of parties
thereto.
Nature of required writing.
Option to purchase.

ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Adjoining landowners.
Agent's authority.
Blank deeds or papers.
Contents of deed.
Corporate officers.
Custom and usage.
Dedication of land.
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Oral contracts to buy or sell land.
Parol executed agreement.
Parol partition.
Part performance of oral contract generally.
-Improvements and other expenditures.
Pleading.
Recovery of money paid under parol contract.
Release, discharge and surrender.
Restrictive covenants.
Specific performance.
Subscription.
-Joint tenants.
Trusts.
Wills.
Writings construed together.
Cited.
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tion for dismissal of the action. Lee v.
Polyhrones, 57 Utah 401, 195 P. 201 (1921).
A corporati9n cannot be held to be the agent
of or a trustee for a stockholder unless this section is complied with. Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah
268, 9 P.2d 396 (1932).

Blank deeds or papers.
Blank deeds which were executed before the
description had been placed thereon were void
and did not convey any interest or title whatever. Utah State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 (1919).
Contents of deed.
Where grantors sought to rescind a transaction because the name of the grantee of the
deed did not appear on the paper at the time
the grantors signed it, it was held this section
required only the signature of the grantor in
order to bind him to the transaction. Hanson v.
Beehive Sec. Co., 14 Utah 2d 157, 380 P.2d 66
(1963).

Construction and application.
The meaning of the word "interest" in this
section depends on statutory construction governed by legislative intent. In re Reynolds' Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270 (1936).
Adjoining landowners.
Oral agreement between adjoining landowners as to location of a boundary line is not
within statute of frauds, provided, among other
things, the location of the true boundary line
sought to be thus established is or has been
uncertain or in dispute. But mere fact that the
person claiming title by parol agreement owns
land adjacent to the land thus sought to be conveyed cannot and does not change statute of
frauds requiring conveyance ofreal estate to be
in writing, without regard to any uncertainty
in location of true boundary line. Tripp v.
Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417
(1928).
If adjoining landowners acquiesce in a division line other than the true line, with knowledge of the location of the true line and with a
design and purpose of thereby transferring a
tract of land from one to the other, such acquiescence alone will not operate as a conveyance.
Land cannot be conveyed from one person to
another by merely changing possession, even
though such change in possession continues for
a long period of time. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah
57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (1928).

Corporate officers.
This section is applicable to agents of corporations, but the courts have adopted an exception when the person who acts under an oral
authorization is either a general agent or executive officer of the corporation. In the case of
an executive officer of a corporation an exception from the requirement of written authority
is based upon the idea that he is something
more than an agent. He is the representative of
the corporation itself. Mathis v. Madsen, 1
Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952 (1953).
Custom and usage.
Evidence of a course of dealing or of industry
usage and custom is not admissible to show
that real property used to secure one obligation
pursuant to a trust deed is also meant to secure
another obligation. Hector, Inc. v. United Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987).
Dedication of land.
Implied dedication ofland for highway is not
within statute of frauds. Schettler v. Lynch, 23
Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901).
Defenses to action on contract.
Under this section, fraud and deceit may
constitute the gravamen of an action, notwithstanding that the breach of a contract within
the statute is incidentally involved, and the
statute in such a case is not a defense. But if
the gravamen of the action is breach of an oral
contract for sale of land, it is a defense although fraud and deceit are incidentally involved. Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404,
274 P. 856 (1929).

Agent's authority.
Where, at the time an agreement for the purchase of land was entered into, there was no
statute requiring an agent's authority to contract for the purchase of real estate to be in
writing, the contract would not be invalidated.
Le Vine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2,
1912C Ann. Cas. 407 (1910).
In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, held in absence of evidence showing defendant's agent
was authorized in writing to sell real property
or equities taking the case out of the statute of
frauds, the trial court properly granted a mo-

Easements.
Where contract seller acquiesced to the relocation of an easement ditch, contract purchaser's and defendants' oral agreement to
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A parol lease of lands which has been fully
performed by lessor is not within the statute.
Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d
282 (1942).

move the ditch was valid even though contract
purchaser did not complete the contract, and
even though not in writing; contract was
thereby enforceable against a subsequent purchaser from the landowner. Lyman Grazing
Ass'n v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905
(1970).
Right sought by defendants to maintain a
pipeline across plaintiffs land was an easement and was required to be in writing in the
absence of sufficient evidence to support a finding of part performance under an oral or implied agreement. Wells v. Marcus, 25 Utah 2d
242, 480 P.2d 129 (1971).
Oral agreement to execute easement if a federal lease was acquired, but which agreement
was never put into writing or executed, could
not later be asserted as an exception to the
statute of frauds. McKinnon v. Corporation of
President of Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974).

Modifications of contract.
Agreement altering or modifying an original
contract must also be in writing and subscribed. Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71
Utah 535, 267 P. 1020 (1928).
The words "as per agreement of 12-8-73"
written on a check were not a sufficient memorandum in writing to modify a written contract
for sale of real estate and satisfy the statute of
frauds. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d
1319 (Utah 1975).
If the original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement .that
modifies any of the material parts of the original must also satisfy the statute unless a party
has changed position by performing an oral
modification so that it would be inequitable to
permit the other party to found a claim or defense on the original agreement. Allen v.
Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986).

Gifts.
This section has been applied to a parol gift
of land, where the donor exercised acts of exclusive occupancy over the premises during the
donee's occupancy, notwithstanding that the
latter made improvements thereon, but not of a
substantial or permanent character. Price v.
Lloyd, 43 Utah 441, 135 P. 268 (1913).
Under this section an oral gift or grant of
land can only be established by evidence that
is clear, convincing and unequivocal, more especially where the alleged donor and donee are
close relations such as mother and daughter.
Nor will the mere making of improvements on
the land by alleged donee suffice to prove a gift
of the land. Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah 205,
293 P. 7 (1930) (decided under prior law).

Mortgages, and estates or interests of parties thereto.
Since a real estate mortgagor holds title in
fee subject to the mortgage lien, he has such
estate or interest in land as may be conveyed
only by written instrument under this section.
Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118
(1948).
Nature of required writing.
Letter from partners to partnership employee informing him that he owned undivided
10% interest in partnership satisfied statute of
frauds relating to conveyances of real property
even though it failed to mention consideration
and was otherwise not complete contract, since
all that is required under section is that interest be granted or declared by writing subscribed by party to be charged. Guinand v.
Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969).

"Interest in real property."
Where grantor sought to repudiate a deed
conveying land because of his incapacity at the
time of execution, and grantee orally agreed
that, in consideration that grantor would let
deed stand, he would pay grantor for life onehalf of the crops produced on the land, it was
held that the agreement was not one for an
"estate or interest in real property" within this
section. Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Utah 408, 88
P. 230 (1906).
Oral agreement between a builder and a
landowner that a building should remain personal property is not within statute, because
not involving the sale of an interest in land.
Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400,266 P. 1033,
58 A.L.R. 1346 (1928).

Option to purchase.
Joint owner ofland who had orally agreed to,
but had not signed, option to purchase was not
obligated to sell real property, and specific performance would not lie to compel conveyance.
Eckard v. Smith, 527 P.2d 660 (Utah 1974).
Where option to purchase omitted mention of
oil or mineral rights, court properly admitted
evidence showing that defendant had leased
the oil and mineral rights to a third party,
which lease had been ratified by the plaintiffs.
Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah 1975).

Leases.
A stranger cannot avail himself of the requirement that a lease for more than a year
must be in writing, when the stranger is sued
by lessee for trespass. Livingston v. Thomley,
74 Utah 516, 280 P. 1042 (1929).

Oral contracts to buy or sell land.
Mere oral agreement to purchase land from
another is within statute of frauds. Chadwick
v. Arnold, 34 Utah 48, 95 P. 527 (1908).
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Herschel Gold Mining Co., 103 Utah 249, 134
P.2d 1094 (1943).
Doctrine of part performance to take oral
contract out of the statute of frauds is purely
equitable in nature and has no place in an action at law. Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184
P.2d 335 (1947).
Where there was no memorandum reduced
to writing or no writing subscribed by the parties to be charged, but the deceased had accepted the consideration and surrendered possession, there was sufficient part performance
to avoid the statute of frauds and the deceased's heirs and successors in title and interest were not entitled to repudiate the contract.
Such an act would in fact constitute a fraud. In
re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P.2d
595 (1953).
Where plaintiff moved from another city and
took care of personal and business affairs of the
decedent in reliance upon an oral contract,
proved to be clear and certain, the contract was
removed from the statute of frauds. Randall v.
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18,305 P.2d
480 (1956).
Sufficient correspondence and part performance were reflected in record in unjust enrichment action to take oral agreement to
build house for $3,000 out of statute of frauds.
Jensen v. Whitesides, 13 Utah 2d 193, 370 P.2d
765 (1962).
Advancement of $44,000 toward development of quarries was sufficient part performance to remove oral contract from bar of this
statute. LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson,
26 Utah 2d 158, 486 P.2d 1040 (1971).
Doctrine of part performance is not available
in an action at law for monetary damages for
breach of oral contract to convey land.
McKinnon v. Corporation of President of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974).
In a case where the existence of an oral contract for the sale of seven lots was admitted by
both parties, part performance in the form of a
down payment, two interest payments, and
conveyance of three lots was enough to remove
the contract from the statute of frauds. Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413 (Utah
1984).

Parol executed agreement.
While no interest in land can be created,
transferred, or surrendered by merely parol executory agreement, a parol executed agreement by a tenant to surrender leased premises
was not void under the statute of frauds. Aaron
v. Holmes, 35 Utah 49, 99 P. 450 (1908).
Parol partition.
Partition of land among coheirs is not ineffective, at least in equity, because made by
parol, if followed by actual possession in severalty of parcels into which land was divided.
Whittemore v. Cope, 11 Utah 344, 40 P. 256
(1895).
A parol partition between joint owners of
real property, when carried out and followed by
actual possession in severalty of the several
parcels, is valid and will be enforced notwithstanding the statute of frauds. Allen v. Allen,
50 Utah 104, 166 P. 1169 (1917).
Part performance of oral contract generally.
While a verbal gift or parol agreement to
convey land is within the statute of frauds and
at law a nullity, a verbal agreement, if part
performed, can, notwithstanding requirement
of statute, be enforced by court of equity. Price
v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.S. (n.s.)
870 (1906).
In a proceeding to enforce a parol gift of land
on the theory of part performance, a showing of
the making of valuable, or substantial, or beneficial improvements by the donee in possession, or the doing of other analogous acts which
would render revocation and refusal to complete inequitable, is essential to enforcement.
Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 870 (1906).
Oral contract by decedent to make will leaving property to plaintiff in consideration of services to be rendered, was enforceable where
plaintiff rendered such services as he was
called upon to perform under contract up to
time of death of deceased, and during which
time he was in possession of property by arrangement made by deceased. Van Natta v.
Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920).
In an action to quiet title, defended on the
ground that defendant had entered into an oral
contract to purchase property, it was not only
incumbent upon defendant to prove a certain,
definite, and unambiguous contract for the
purchase of property, but also such acts in part
performance thereof as in equity are considered sufficient to take the case out of the statute of frauds. Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah
575, 206 P. 262, 33 A.L.R. 1481 (1929).
The acts which are alleged to constitute part
performance must be in pursuance of the oral
contract which it is claimed said performance
saves. Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v.

-Improvements
and other expenditures.
In an action to enforce a parol gift ofland on
the theory of part performance, the improvements were not of such value or character as to
take the case out of the operation of this statute. Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8
L.R.S. (n.s.) 870 (1906).
In an action to quiet title, defended on the
ground that defendant had entered into an oral
contract to purchase property and had gone
into possession, making of small improvements
by defendant was held insufficient to take the
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or to comply with the terms of the contract, he
could, with the consent of the vendor, rescind
the contract and abandon all of his rights under it; and if this is done by any acts or conduct
which clearly manifest an intention to rescind
or abandon the contract by both vendor and
vendee, and vendor takes possession in pursuance of the parol agreement, then the rescission is complete and binding on both parties.
Cutright v. Union Sav. & Inv. Co., 33 Utah
486, 94 P. 984, 14 Ann. Cas. 725 (1908).
An executory contract with respect to real
property may not be rescinded or discharged,
unless by act or operation of law, where neither party is in default, without some form of
written agreement entered into between the
contracting parties; but where there is breach
or abandonment of contract by either party,
the rule is otherwise. Thackeray v. Knight, 57
Utah 21, 192 P. 263 (1920).
A wholly executory oral rescission of an earnest money agreement to purchase a home was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986).

case out of the statute of frauds. Hargreaves v.
Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262, 33 A.L.R.
1481 (1922).
In a quiet title action in which the defense
was that defendant was in possession pursuant
to a parol gift, evidence that defendant made
expenditures upon the real estate was not sufficient to take the case out of the statute of
frauds, even had defendant definitely proven a
promise to give her the property, where the
value of defendant's free use of the property
exceeded the amount allegedly spent for the
improvements. Moffat v. Hoffman, 61 Utah
482, 214 P. 308 (1923).
In an action for specific performance of an
oral agreement to convey the east half of a certain parcel of land which was made after the
written agreement in which plaintiff was to
have an undivided one-half interest, evidence
that the land was definitely described, that
plaintiff entered on part of the east half in reliance upon the parol agreement and actually
occupied a substantial portion thereof, and
made permanent and valuable improvements
thereon, all with the knowledge and consent of
the vendors, and that plaintiff paid the full
purchase price, was sufficient evidence of part
performance to take the oral agreement out of
the operation of the statute of frauds. Hogan v.
Swayze, 65 Utah 380, 237 P. 1097 (1925).

Restrictive covenants.
Land which was included in an unsuccessful
petition for rezoning was not bound by restrictive covenants executed in connection with a
later successful petition, where the land, although rezoned, had not been included in the
later petition and the owner had not signed the
petition or document of restrictive covenants.
Gunnell v. Hurst Lumber Co., 30 Utah 2d 209,
515 P.2d 1274 (1973).
Specific performance.
In a proceeding to enforce a parol gift of land
on the theory of part performance, acts done
prior to the contract, since they are neither in
pursuance nor in execution ofit, are never part
performance upon which to base specific performance of the agreement by court of equity.
Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 870 (1906).
An action to collect money due under a parol
lease is not an action in specific performance.
Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d
282 (1942).
Plaintiffs who had made a down payment,
had completed mortgage payments, and had
paid special curb and gutter assessment pursuant to oral contract for purchase of realty were
entitled to specific performance. Woolsey v.
Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975).
Subscription.
A document to be enforceable under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the party
granting the conveyance. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utal1 1986).
-Joint tenants.
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint
tenant, by contract to purchase the common

Pleading.
If the statute of frauds is relied upon, it must
be pleaded. Skeen v. Van Sickle, 71 Utah 577,
268 P. 562 (1928).
Recovery of money paid under parol contract.
Where defendant verbally agreed with the
owner of real estate which was subject to a
mortgage to bid for the property in a foreclosure sale and to convey title to plaintiff for a
sum certain after he obtained the sheriff's
deed, and plaintiff relied on the agreement and
paid the specified amount to defendant who asserted ownership to the property and refused to
convey, it was held that a trust ex maleficio
arose, and was enforceable though the contract
was not in writing. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34
Utah 48, 95 P. 527 (1908).
Release, discharge and surrender.
Surrender of an interest under a contract for
the purchase of land could be properly effected
without deed or conveyance in writing in compliance with this statute. Budge v. Barron, 51
Utah 234, 169 P. 745 (1917).
Mortgagor's oral surrender of his interest in
the land to mortgagee is within this section, so
as to be unenforceable. Bybee v. Stuart, 112
Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948).
Where the right of a purchaser under a contract for the sale of land was subject to forfeiture upon failure or refusal to make payments
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of a single transaction and entitled to be read
together to fulfill the requirements of the statute of frauds where the check contained a notation "½ payment on land as agreed-other ½
payment when deed delivered" and the check
was delivered by the grantee named in the
deed to the grantor named in the deed who
endorsed the check and deposited it in his
checking account, the contents of the unsigned
deed expressly referred to the parties in question and specifically described the subject matter property, the deed was delivered to the custody of a bank a few days after the delivery of
part payment, and the named grantor acknowledged the propriety of the deed.
Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah
1980).
Several writings may be construed together
as containing all the terms of a contract for the
sale of real property, notwithstanding that not
all are signed by the party to be charged; to
satisfy the requirements of the statute of
frauds, some nexus between the writings must
be shown, which requirement may be satisfied
either by express reference in the signed writing to the unsigned one, or by implied reference gleaned from the contents of the writings
and the circumstances surrounding the transaction, in which instance parol evidence may
be used to connect an unsigned document to
one that has been signed by the person to be
charged. Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369
(Utah 1980).

property since she had not signed the contract
nor given written authority to agent to sign for
her. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah
1986).
Trusts.
Where property was paid for with money of
the husband, and title thereto was taken in
name of the wife, a resulting trust arose, to
which the statute of frauds did not apply. Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 180 P. 586
(1919).
A trust in real property must be created by a
writing signed by the settlor or his agent.
Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah
1981).

Wills.
Where a will is sought to be maintained also
as a contract, it must satisfy the statute of
frauds. Ward v. Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P.2d
635 (1938) (decided under prior law).
Writings construed together.
Several writings may be construed together
as containing all the terms of a contract,
though only one is signed by the party to be
charged; therefore, a written instrument containing an offer to exchange properties, but too
indefinite as to terms to satisfy this statute,
and signed by only one party, may be construed with deeds subsequently executed and
placed in escrow by both parties, for the purpose of establishing a valid agreement within
the statute of frauds, where the deeds were executed before the attempted withdrawal of the
offer by the party who signed it. Miller v. Hancock, 67 Utah 202, 246 P. 949 (1926).
A check and an unsigned deed were evidence

Cited in Murray v. State, 737 P.2d 1000
(Utah 1987); O.1.C., Inc. v. Wilcox, 738 P.2d
630 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. -The Doctrine of Part
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 91.
An Appraisal of the Utah Statute of Frauds,
9 Utah L. Rev. 978.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds §§ 44-128.
A.L.R. - Price fixed in contract violating
statute of frauds as evidence of value in action
on quantum meruit, 21 A.L.R.3d 9.
Applicability of statute of frauds to agreement to rescind contract for sale of land, 42
A.L.R.3d 242.
Validity of lease or sublease subscribed by
one of the parties only, 46 A.L.R.3d 619.

Conflict of laws: comment note on statute of
frauds and conflict of laws, 47 A.L.R.3d 137.
Promissory estoppel as basis for avoidance of
statute of frauds, 56 A.L.R.3d 1037.
Exceptions to rule that oral gifts of land are
unenforceable under statute of frauds, 83
A.L.R.3d 1294.
Check given in land transaction as sufficient
writing to satisfy statute of frauds, 9 A.L.R.4th
1009.
Oil and gas royalty as real or personal property, 56 A.L.R.4th 539.
Key Numbers. - Frauds, Statute of 41:->
55-80.
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25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted.
The next preceding section [25-5-1] s~all not be construed ~o affect the
power of a testator in the disposition o_f~1s real ~state ~y la~t will a~d te~tament; nor to prevent any trust from arismg or bemg extmgmshed by implication or operation of law.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2462;
C.L. 1917, § 5812; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
could be reopened. Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah
2d 189, 264 P.2d 852 (1953).
A deed given to secure a debt, though absolute in form, was in equity a mortgage, so that
a trust was created by operation of law and,
under the express language of this section, was
not prevented by§ 25-5-1. Taylor v. Turner, 27
Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972).

ANALYSIS

Constructive trust.
Trusts.
-Evidence.
Wills.
Constructive trust.
Constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment is not within the statute of frauds.
Camesecca v. Camesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah
1977).

Trusts.
Trusts arising by implication or operation of
law are expressly excluded from the effects of
the statute; and a deed of conveyance, though
absolute in form, if given to secure a debt, is in
equity treated as a mortgage - a trust by operation oflaw. Wasatch Mining Co. v. Jennings,
5 Utah 243, 15 P. 65 (1887).
Where defendant verbally agreed with the
owner of real estate which was subject to a
mortgage to bid the property in at foreclosure
sale, and to convey title to plaintiff for a sum
certain after he obtained the sheriff's deed, and
plaintiff relied on such agreement and paid the
specified amount to defendant who asserted
ownership to the property and refused to convey, it was held that a trust ex maleficio arose,
and was enforceable though the contract was
not in writing. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah
48, 95 P. 527 (1908).
Equity imposes a constructive trust to prevent one from unjustly profiting through fraud
or the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. Hawkins v.
Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953).
Where defendant altered a certificate of sale
of land by inserting his own name as purchaser, and the land was not included in the
decedent's estate which was distributed in
1924, there was a constructive trust for the
benefit of the decedent's heirs, and the estate
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-Evidence.
One seeking to have rights declared and enforced, founded upon or growing out of trust or
a confidential relation, is required to show,
with at least reasonable certainty, the terms of
agreement and the character and extent of the
trust or confidential relation. Coray v.
Holbrook, 40 Utah 325, 121 P. 572 (1912).
Parol evidence is admissible to show a trust
relationship by operation of law. Barrett v.
Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 P.2d 772 (1941).
In an action to impress a trust upon real
property, evidence supported a finding that
grantor's daughter took the property by warranty deed subject to "oral trust" whereby
daughter was to maintain the property as a
family home to be used by grantor and her children and grandchildren for as long as any of
said persons needed a home, with complete discretion in the daughter as to the time and as to
which of said persons should use property.
Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229
(1949).
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove a
constructive trust or resulting trust since they
arise by operation of law and are expressly excluded from the statute of frauds by this section. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah
1982).

Wills.
When a will is sought to be maintained also
as a contract, it must satisfy this and succeeding sections of the statute of frauds. Ward v.
Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P.2d 635 (1938).
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25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2463;
C.L 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33.5.3_
NOTES TO DECISIONS
merely explained the transaction. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975).
This section requires that any agent executing an agreement conveying an interest in
land on behalf of his principal must be authorized in writing; since written authorization is
required to clothe the agent initially with authority to contract, principal's ratification of an
unauthorized act of the agent must be in writing. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah
1982).

ANALYSIS

Agent's authority.
Defenses to action on contract.
Description of land.
Executed agreements.
Execution of contract.
Improvements on land.
Interest in real estate.
Leases.
-Option to renew.
-Oral extension of lease.
-Parol leases.
Lease with option to lease.
Note or memorandum.
Option to purchase realty.
Oral renewal of written offer.
Part performance of oral contract.
-Evidence.
Promissory estoppel.
Recovery upon quantum meruit or theory of
unjust enrichment.
Sale defined.
Settling of accounts.
Subscription.
Surrender, release or discharge.
Termination or rescission of contract.

Description of land.
A contract which provided that the purchaser of land was to make the selection of the
land from a larger tract which was described
was sufficient so that there could be a valid
contract. Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court,
2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168, 46 A.L.R.2d 887
(1954).
Where the parties left the description of Parcel 1 open and "to be approved by all the parties in writing," the identity and location of the
land to be conveyed was subject to their subsequent agreement, and no contract was formed.
The buyers were entitled to the return of their
payment, since the document was not a contract that could be enforced under this section.
Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).

Agent's authority.
In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, in the absence of evidence showing defendant's agent
was authorized in writing to sell real property
or equities taking the case out of the statute of
frauds, the trial court properly granted motion
for dismissal of the action. Lee v. Polyhrones,
57 Utah 401, 195 P. 201 (1921).
Where real estate agents had no express or
implied authority under listing agreement to
execute contract of sale of real estate on behalf
of vendors, latter were not bound by the terms
of an earnest money agreement. Frandsen v.
Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971).
Introduction of parol evidence was proper to
show that agent who made contract in his own
name was acting for corporate principal, since
the proof did not contradict the writing but

Executed agreements.
This section has no application to agreements which are fully executed. Cutright v.
Union Sav. & Inv. Co., 33 Utah 486, 94 P. 984,
14 Ann. Cas. 725 (1908).
Execution of contract.
Contracts of this kind, to be binding and enforceable, need be signed by vendor only, and
specific performance will not be denied for lack
of mutuality because not signed by vendee. Le
Vine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2,
1912C Ann. Cas. 407 (1910).
Improvements on land.
In an action to quiet title to real property
wherein the defense was that defendant was in
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possession pursuant to a parol gift, evidence
that defendant made expenditures upon the
real estate was not sufficient to take the case
out of the statute of frauds, even had defendant
definitely proven promise to give her the property, where the value of defendant's free use of
the property exceeded the amount allegedly
spent for the improvements. Moffat v. Hoffman, 61 Utah 482, 214 P. 308 (1923).
Improvements upon premises may take a
contract out of the statute of frauds. Latses v.
Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619
(1940).
Permanent improvements made by lessee
under an agreement with an agent of the lessor
providing that in consideration thereof a tenant would be entitled to an option for a new
lease at the termination of his three-year tenancy took the contract out of the statute of
frauds. Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214,
104 P.2d 619 (1940).
Absentee owners had constructive notice of
improvements placed upon land by lessee under a contract negotiated by the agent of the
owners who lacked written authority, and were
estopped to claim that contract was within
statute of frauds. Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99
Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940).
Acceptance by property owner of monthly
payments for two years by alleged lessees, who
had made extensive improvements, was sufficient part performance to take five-year lease
with option to purchase out of statute of frauds.
Adams v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 296, 391 P.2d 837
(1964).
Interest in real estate.
An offer to purchase when accepted creates
an interest in real estate and is within the statute of frauds. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d
421 (Utah 1986).

Leases.
An agreement to enter into a future agreement to lease real estate for a period longer
than a year is within the statute of frauds, and
must be in writing to be enforceable. SCM
Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105
(Utah 1986).
Where lessee of a sixth floor suite had executed a renewal lease agreement and entered
into an oral contract to enter into a written
lease for additional space on the sixth floor, the
agreement was violative of the statute of
frauds and lessee could not rely on lessor's
breaking of the oral contract as a basis for his
own breaking of the written agreement. SCM
Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105
(Utah 1986).
Lease of realty by parol for more than year is
ofno force or effect whatever. Utah Optical Co.
v. Keith, 18 Utah 464, 56 P. 155 (1899).
A letter which lacks an acknowledgement or
recognition that a contract has been entered

into by the parties, and which is relied upon as
a memorandum written after an oral acceptance of an oral offer of a lease, and not as a
written and signed offer of a lease, is not an
adequate memorandum. Birdzell v. Utah Oil
Ref. Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952).
In an oral contract to execute a lease for a
period longer than one year, the amount of the
rent is one of the essential terms which must
appear in a memorandum. Birdzell v. Utah Oil
Ref. Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952).

-Option to renew.
. An oral notice of election to exercise an option to renew a written lease for a period longer than one year does not violate the statute
of frauds. Hurlburt v. Gullo, 750 P.2d 613
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
-Oral extension of lease.
An oral agreement to make a contract which
must itself be in writing is itself within the
statute of frauds. This has been applied to an
oral contract to extend or renew a written lease
for five years. Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v.
Herschel Gold Mining Co., 103 Utah 249, 134
P.2d 1094 (1943).
-Parol leases.
A parol lease of land, which has been fully
performed by lessor, is not within the statute.
Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d
282 (1942).
Lease with option to lease.
Where written lease contained option to
lease adjoining premises owned by lessor, fact
that lessee did not formally exercise option but
did use the premises to store equipment, provided sufficient grounds to hold lessee liable
for rent during period not barred by statute of
limitations, and this section was no bar to recovery by lessor. Fredrickson Bldrs. Supply &
Constr. Co. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 22 Utah 2d
405, 454 P.2d 288 (1969).
Note or memorandum.
Memorandum, to be binding and enforceable, need be signed by vendor only, and specific performance will not be denied for lack of
mutuality because not signed by vendee. Le
Vine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2,
1912C Ann. Cas. 407 (1910).
A receipt or memorandum is wholly insufficient to take an alleged parol contract for sale
of land out of the statute of frauds, where it
merely recites receipt of $30 as part payment
for the land, but contains no description of the
land alleged to have been sold. Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915).
The memorandum which is relied upon to
satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all
the essential terms and provisions of the contract. Birdzell v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 121 Utah
412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952).
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An acknowledgment or recognition that a
contract has been entered into by the parties
need not be shown by memorandum in cases
where a written and signed offer is relied upon
as a memorandum, for the acceptance may be
proved by oral testimony. Birdzell v. Utah Oil
Ref. Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952).
Minutes of a city board of commissioners
meeting, approving an exchange of land with
an individual and authorizing the mayor to
make the transfer, but which were not subscribed by the parties and did not describe the
city property in question, did not contain the
essential terms and provisions to constitute a
memorandum that would satisfy this section.
Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 291, 495 P.2d
814 (1972).
Although letters and correspondence of parties did not precisely describe mining claim or
terms of agreement, they constituted sufficient
memorandum of agreement to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. Peterson v.
Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974).
Memorandum of a contract for sale of real
property was constituted by three receipts from
decedent to his son, referring to transaction as
a "sale," stating the amount of the consideration, acknowledging receipt of payment, referring to the number of acres sold, and subscribed by decedent as seller. In re Estate of
Bonny, 600 P.2d 548 (Utah 1979).
Written memorandum was insufficient to
take an alleged oral contract for sale of land
out of the statute of frauds where the memorandum was not signed by the party by whom
the sale was to be made and did not contain the
essential terms and provisions of the oral contract. McDonald v. Barton Bros. Inv. Corp., 631
P.2d 851 (Utah 1981).
Option to purchase realty.
Written option for son and daughter-in-law
to buy parents' ranch by making monthly payments of $150 for about 22 months after which
no cash payments were required, the balance
to be paid out of ranch's production was a sufficient memorandum under the particular facts
of the case to satisfy statute of frauds.
Mackelprang v. Mackelprang, 19 Utah 2d 63,
426 P.2d 10 (1967).
In an action for specific performance of an
option agreement for the sale of realty, where
extension of the option agreement was signed
by vendor but not by vendor's wife who was a
joint tenant of the property, this section barred
vendee's enforcement of such agreement, since
an option to purchase is an interest in real estate and is within this section and vendee
failed to show ratification or estoppel. Coombs
v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356
(1970).

Oral renewal of written offer.
Where written offer to sublease property for
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ten-year period was rejected orally, offeree retaining written offer, subsequent oral renewal
of offer and acceptance thereof was not within
statute of frauds, oral renewal of offer being
simply resubmission of rejected written offer.
Mendelson v. Roland, 66 Utah 487, 243 P. 798
(1926).

Part performance of oral contract.
Doctrine of part performance to take oral
contract out of statute of frauds is purely equitable in nature and has no place in action at
law, and consequently doctrine was not available to plaintiff in action at law for money
damages for breach of oral agreement to sell
land, so that complaint predicated on part performance failed to state cause of action. Baugh
v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1947).
Where there was no memorandum reduced
to writing or no writing subscribed by the parties to be charged but the deceased had accepted the consideration and surrendered possession there was sufficient part performance
to avoid the statute of frauds and the deceased's heirs and successors in title and interest should not be allowed to repudiate the contract. In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327,259
P.2d 595 (1953).
Making of surveys and preparation of deeds
were merely preparatory to an exchange of
lands and did not constitute partial performance sufficient to take the contract for exchange out of the operation of this section.
Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 291,495 P.2d
814 (1972).
Buyers who proceeded with performance for
twelve years under an oral contract for the sale
of realty (paying all but $49 of down payment,
paying sellers' mortgage payments which covered taxes and insurance, discharging special
improvement assessment and making improvements to the property) established sufficient performance to remove the contract from
the statute of frauds and entitle them to specific performance. Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d
1035 (Utah 1975).
Evidence was sufficient to establish part performance of an oral contract for the sale of land
so as to remove the statute of frauds as a bar to
such contract where vendee, who was a cotenant with vendor, made improvements whose
value far exceeded the rental value of the property and were not .such improvements that
would be made by a tenant in the ordinary use
of the premises; vendee paid a valuable consideration to vendor for the property; vendee's
possession of the property was open and known
to vendor and not without vendor's consent;
and vendee's improvements, consideration and
possession were exclusively referable to the
contract. Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54 (Utah
1980).
The doctrine of part performance was not ap-
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plicable where the alleged acts of part performance were not referable to the alleged oral
contract to sell land. McDonald v. Barton Bros.
Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981).
The doctrine of partial performance was not
applicable where all of the acts alleged were
not exclusively referable to the alleged oral
modification of a construction and lease agreement. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740
P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
-Evidence.
Purchaser of land under an oral contract
seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under the
doctrine of part performance, based upon his
possession of the land and improvements
thereon, must establish that possession was actual, open, exclusive and with the seller's consent; improvements made were substantial,
valuable and beneficial; a valuable consideration was given in exchange for the conveyance; and all of the foregoing was exclusively
referable to the contract. Coleman v. Dillman,
624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981).
To meet the part performance exception to
the statute of frauds, the terms of the oral contract must be established by clear and definite
evidence. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74
(Utah 1982).
Promissory estoppel.
The elements of promissory estoppel necessary to preclude the operation of this section
were not present in a case where a lessee and a
man claiming to be the lessor entered into an
oral agreement for the lease of property and
the lease was to be reduced to writing by the
lessor but was never written because the lessor
learned of a defect in the chain of title. The
lessee moved on the property and then brought
action against the claimed lessor. The lessee
did not expend any moneys upon the leased
premises, but was damaged because of the loss
of a good bargain. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d
386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956).
Recovery upon quantum meruit or theory
of unjust enrichment.
Where defendant owner entered into oral

agreement to sell described land to plaintiff at
specified price, which was void under this section, and plaintiff thereafter entered into contract to sell same land to third person at profit,
but, when defendant learned of latter contract,
he refused to sell to plaintiff and sold land to
third person for same amount that latter had
agreed to pay plaintiff, plaintiff was not entitled to recover on theory of unjust enrichment
for value of his services in procuring purchaser, even in absence of§ 25-5-4(5). Baugh
v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1947).
Sale defined.
As applied to land, the word "sale" implies
the creation of an estate in excess of a leasehold, by the act of the owner. Lewis v. Dahl,
108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362, 160 A.L.R. 1040
(1945).
Settling of accounts.
Defense that agreement by wife to convey
ranch to former husband and herself jointly
was not in writing and thereby void was not
invocable in equity proceedings of settling accounts between the parties where ranch had
been sold and court was concerned only with
distribution of proceeds. Corbet v. Corbet, 24
Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970).
Subscription.
A document to be enforceable under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the party
granting the conveyance. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).
Surrender, release or discharge.
Surrender of interest under contract for purchase ofland could be properly effected without
a deed or conveyance in writing in compliance
with this statute. Budge v. Barron, 51 Utah
234, 169 P. 745 (1917).
Termination or rescission of contract.
An agreement to terminate or rescind a contract must be in writing, if the contract that is
extinguished falls within the statute of frauds.
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d
105 (Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
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25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed.
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to
be charged therewith:
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(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or
intestate out of his own estate.
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L.
1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933
& c. 1943, 33-5-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
defendant, he must interpose a special plea of
this statute if statute is to be available as a
defense. Abba v. Smyth, 21 Utah 109, 59 P. 756
(1899).
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party
relying upon it as a defense. M & S Constr. &
Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 19 Utah 2d
86, 426 P.2d 227 (1967).
Defendant, who answered by a general denial and simultaneous motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim as being barred under Subsection
(2) of this section, proceeded improperly, since
under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, statute of frauds is not a ground for motion to dismiss but rather an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c). W.W. & W.B. Gardner,
Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252
(1970).

ANALYSIS

Accord and satisfaction.
Affirmative defense.
Alteration or modification of original contract.
Assignments.
Brokerage contracts.
-Action by broker.
-Finder's agreement.
-Fully executed contracts.
-Procuring lessee.
-Procuring option.
-Subscription.
City council minutes.
Contract not to be performed within a year.
-Automobile rental.
Contract to make will.
Evidence.
-Proving nature of agreement.
Part performance.
Promise to recover for another's debt or default.
-Promisor's own purposes served.
Recovery upon quantum meruit.
Revocation or release of agreement to answer
for debt of another.
Stipulation.
Unilateral contracts.

Alteration or modification of original contract.
If original contract, to be binding and enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of frauds, is
required to be in writing and subscribed by
parties sought to be charged, then a subsequent agreement altering or modifying any of
its material parts or terms is also required to
be in writing and so subscribed, no part performance or anything done by such party in reliance on the subsequent agreement being alleged or proved, especially if interest in land is
involved. Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71
Utah 535, 267 P. 1020 (1928).
Parties may modify orally an agreement in
writing where the original contract is not required by the statute of frauds to be in writing,
at least where there is consideration for such
modification. But a contract required by the
statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be
modified by a subsequent oral agreement, although this rule is subject to many exceptions,
the first great division coming between execu-

Accord and satisfaction.
Although it is well settled in Utah that if an
original agreement is within the statute of
frauds, a subsequent modifying agreement
must also satisfy the statute of frauds, an accord and satisfaction is something entirely different and need not be in writing, even if the
original contract was within the statute of
frauds. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699
P.2d 730 (Utah 1985).
Affirmative defense.
When an action is on a contract, admitted by
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tory and executed modifications. Bamberger
Co. v. Certified Prods., Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48
P.2d 489, aff'd on rehearing, 88 Utah 213, 53
P.2d 1153 (1935).
An oral modification of a contract required to
be in writing, when such modification is fully
executed, is taken out of the statute. If a party
has changed his position by performing an oral
modification, so that it would be inequitable to
permit the other party to found a claim upon
the original agreement as unmodified, or defeat the former's claim by setting up a defense
that performance was not according to the
written contract, after he has induced or consented to the former going forward, the modified agreement will be held valid. This rule has
been applied to performance of orally modified
lease by lessee. Bamberger Co. v. Certified
Prods., Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489, aff'd on
rehearing, 88 Utah 213, 53 P.2d 1153 (1935).
Assignments.
An assignment of an account for collection,
with instructions to bring action in assignee's
name, may be made by parol. Merchants'
Credit Bureau v. Robinson, 68 Utah 470, 251
P. 10 (1926).

Brokerage contracts.
Letters and telegrams containing a real estate broker's contract are sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Subsection (5), since no
particular form of words is necessary, and almost any kind of writing will be sufficient if it
is signed by party to be charged and contains
essential terms of a contract. Fritsch v. Hess,
49 Utah 75, 162 P. 70 (1916).
Action for specific performance of a contract
for the sale of real property was properly dismissed in the absence of evidence that the
owner's agent was authorized in writing to sell
real property or of equities taking the case out
of statute of frauds. Lee v. Polyhrones, 57 Utah
401, 195 P. 201 (1921).
Before a broker can recover, he must allege
and prove an express contract of employment
in pursuance of which services were rendered
which entitle him to recover the compensation
agreed upon. Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 77
Utah 176, 292 P. 915 (1930).
Under Subsection (5), contracts of real estate
brokers are required to be in writing, and
courts cannot enlarge the terms of, or create
new provisions in, such contracts so as to protect brokers who have performed some services
which would entitle them to compensation if so
provided in the contract, where contract of employment as drawn does not permit a recovery.
Mifflin v. Shiki, 77 Utah 190, 293 P. 1 (1930).
Under Subsection (5), contract with real estate broker listing property for sale must be in
writing. This alone would preclude court from
making a new contract for the parties. Barnard
v. Hardy, 77 Utah 218, 293 P. 12 (1930).

Evil sought to be prevented by rule against
dual representation by real estate broker is no
less vicious because his contract with one side
or the other happens to be void because not in
writing as required by Subsection (5) of this
section. Van Leeuwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah
521, 5 P.2d 714 (1931).
Since contract authorizing broker to sell defendant's Idaho land was one of employment
and did not purport to convey an interest in
land, law of Utah, where contract was made,
would govern, and therefore contract was not
invalidated by failure of defendant's wife to
sign. Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d
134, 159 A.L.R. 256 (1945).
Oral agreement between plaintiff and real
estate broker, under which former was to assist
in securing clients to list property with broker,
was not within prohibition of this section. Anderson v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 P.2d 725,
167 A.L.R. 768 (1945).
Earnest money receipt and offer to purchase
which was signed by vendors, which identified
parties and subject matter and set out conditions of transaction with adequate certainty
and which contained a provision that real estate agent was to receive a commission equal
to the minimum recommended by the city real
estate board (which was usually 5% for that
type of transaction) under which provision was
a handwritten notation that agent was to receive 2½% commission satisfied statute of
frauds. Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299
P.2d 1114 (1957).
Employer of nonlicensed real estate salesman who had executed contract with vendor in
salesman's own name could not recover commission on such contract after subsequent sale
of property by another real estate agency since
employer was not party to contract. Limb v.
Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d
222, 461 P.2d 290 (1969).
Subsection (5) of this section was designed to
protect owners of land from fraudulent and fictitious claims for commissions; it had no application to an alleged implied agreement between two parties using a real estate broker's
license to share a commission on the sale of
condominiums. Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205
(Utah 1976).

-Action by broker.
Real estate broker or agent cannot recover a
commission for services rendered in either selling or procuring a purchaser for real property
unless it appears that there is an express written contract or agreement of authority in
which the terms and conditions of his employment and the amount of the commission are
stated; in the absence of such contract, no recovery can be had for reasonable value of services rendered as upon quantum meruit, nor
for money and time expended for the use and
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benefit of the owner of the property. Case v.
Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640 (1920).
Under this section, broker could recover
commission only by virtue of contract; and he
could not recover as upon quantum meruit.
Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772, 20
A.L.R. 280 (1921). Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah
1, 184 P.2d 335 (1947).

City council minutes.
Where an agreement to repay a developer for
construction of a sewer was set forth in the
minutes of various meetings of the city council,
there was a sufficient memorandum of the
agreement to fulfill the requirements of the
statute of frauds. Midwest Realty v. City of
West Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1975).

-Finder's agreement.
Written contract concerning a finder's agreement between the parties was a sufficient
"note or memorandum" of the parties' agreement, where the contract identified the finder,
the finder's clients, the property owner who
would owe a commission to the finder if a
transaction was closed with any of the finder's
clients, and the commission rate. C.J. Realty,
Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

Contract not to be performed within a
year.
Oral promise to pay money is not invalid under this section, when promise is to be fulfilled
within one year. Thompson v. Whitney, 20
Utah 1, 57 P. 429 (1899).
Contract by grantee of land to pay grantor
for life one-half of crops produced on land was
not within this section, since death might occur
within year. Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Utah 408,
88 P. 230 (1906).
Contracts not to be performed within one
year need to be signed by vendor only, to be
binding and enforceable, and specific performance will not be denied for lack of mutuality
because not signed by vendee. Le Vine v.
Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2, 1912C
Ann. Cas. 407 (1910).
Where written contract was made after date
of employment agreement and just before employment commenced, with no recital that the
employment should continue for any specified
duration, and, after the employer discharged
the employee and the employee sued for a
breach of the written contract and did not
claim that there was any express oral agreement that the employment contract could not
be terminated by either party within a specified period of time, the doctrine of estoppel to
rely on the statute of frauds was inapplicable.
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.,
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960).
A contract between a corporation and its
member masonry contractors providing that
the corporation would furnish certain technical
services to its members and requiring the
members to pay fees on jobs received through
the corporation was not within the statute of
frauds as a contract not to be performed within
one year. Zion's Serv. Corp. v. Danielson, 12
Utah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982 (1961).
Whether agreement by bank to make loan
advances "as and when needed" was offensive
to statute of frauds as an agreement which
could not be performed within a year was question of fact in action against bank for breach of
agreement, thus reversal and remand for new
trial was required where trial court decided the
issue as a matter of law. M & S Constr. &
Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 19 Utah 2d
86, 426 P.2d 227 (1967).
The mere fact that a party violates his promise to pay a debt within a year does not give
him the right to invoke the statute of frauds.

-Fully executed contracts.
Where broker was employed by plaintiff as
an agent to purchase a farm and certain personal property and he was to receive as compensation for his services one-half of the personal property not exceeding $300, after transfer of the farm, defendant broker was required
to account for the personal property in excess
of $300 though contract was oral, since statute
of frauds has no application to fully executed
contracts, and matters arising out of executed
contracts may be enforced. Kerr v. Hillyard, 51
Utah 364, 170 P. 981 (1918).
A fully performed oral lease of lands is not
within the statute. Greenwood v. Jackson, 102
Utah 161, 128 P.2d 282 (1942).
-Procuring lessee.
A contract employing a real estate broker to
procure a lessee for real property does not fall
within requirement of Subsection (5) that an
agreement authorizing a broker to purchase or
sell real estate be in writing. Woolley v.
Wycoff, 2 Utah 2d 329, 273 P.2d 181 (1954).
-Procuring option.
An option to purchase real estate amounts to
an interest in land and an oral contract employing a broker to procure options is unenforceable. Knight v. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 2d
394, 315 P.2d 273 (1957).
-Subscription.
The provision in this section that "[e]very
agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation" must be subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith was designed to protect owners of land from fraudulent and fictitious claims for commissions, and has no bearing on real estate transactions between parties. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah
1986).
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Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343
(1972).

-Automobile rental.
Fact that proposed automobile leasing agreement was not signed and was thus rendered
unenforceable by the statute of frauds did not
prevent trial court from considering evidence
concerning proposed agreement on issue of
rental value and did not prevent lessor from
recovering rental value on quantum meruit
count. Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah
2d 72, 387 P.2d 246, 21 A.L.R.3d 1 (1963).
Where one party accepted and used automobile furnished by other party pursuant to a
contract which was barred by this section, the
latter was entitled to recover from the former
the reasonable value of such services. Bennett
Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d
246, 21 A.L.R.3d 1 (1963).

possession pursuant to a parol gift, evidence
that defendant made expenditures upon the
property was not sufficient to take the case out
of the statute of frauds, even had defendant
definitely proven a promise to give her the
property, where the value of defendant's free
use of the property exceeded the amount allegedly spent for improvements. Moffat v. Hoffman, 61 Utah 482, 214 P. 308 (1923).
Parol contracts for the sale of farmland and
the exchange of water stock were taken out of
the stat~te of frauds by part performance by
the parties who sought specific performance
and by the fact that the parties could easily
have performed within one year. Christensen
v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102 339 P.2d 101
'
(1959).

Promise to recover for another's debt or
default.
Ca1:1seof action against a corporation upon a
promissory note came within § 25-5-6(1) and
was not barred by Subsection (2) of this section. Kahn v. Perry Zolezzi, Inc., 119 Utah 256,
226 P.2d 118 (1950).

Contract to make will.
Oral contract by decedent to make will leaving property to plaintiff in consideration of services to be rendered, held enforceable where
plaintiff rendered such services as he was
c~lled upon to perform under contract up to
time of death of deceased, and during which
time he was in possession of property by arrangement made by deceased. Van Natta v.
Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920).

-Promisor's own purposes served.
If promisor's predominant purpose is to subserve or further his own interest rather than
merely to underwrite the debt of another there
is an original undertaking not within th~ statute of frauds although it may be in form a
promise to pay or discharge the debt of another
and although its performance may incidentally
have the effect of extinguishing the liability of
another. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. v. Western Coop. Hatcheries, 242 F.2d 567 (10th Cir.
1957).
In ?etermining whether there is an original
promise or a collateral promise to answer for
the debt of another, the intention of the parties
governs, and this question is one of fact to be
determined from the words of promise the situation of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances. Sugar v. Miller, 6 Utah 2d 433,
315 P.2d 862 (1957).
Finding by trial court that paving work was
done at the request and for the benefit of defendant showed sufficient intent of the parties to
establish an original oral promise to pay debt,
not barred under Subsection (2). W.W. & W.B.
Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470
P.2d 252 (1970).

Evidence.
Unless the essential terms of the contract
can be determined from the contract itself it is
within this statute, and, if thus defectiv~, defect ~annot be supplied by parol proof, since to
admit parol testimony to supply essential parts
of contract would be to restore the mischief
which the enactment of this statute was intended to prevent. Abba v. Smyth, 21 Utah
109, 59 P. 756 (1899).
Where complaint or answer, which sets up
contract or modification required by statute of
frauds to be in writing, is silent as to whether
it was in writing, it will be assumed to be in
writing until the contrary appears. Bamberger
Co. v. Certified Prods., Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48
P.2d 489, aff'd on rehearing, 88 Utah 213, 53
P.2d 1153 (1935).
-Proving nature of agreement.
Statutes of frauds are intended to bar enforcement of certain agreements that the law
requires to be memorialized in writing, but
such statutes do not prevent a party from proving the true nature of the agreement between
the parties when that is what is at issue rather
than enforceability. Colonial Leasing Co. v.
Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah
1986).

Recovery upon quantum meruit.
If one who, not in default, on faith of and in
accordance with a contract unenforceable because within statute of frauds, but not malum
prohibitum nor malum in se, has, in pursuance
thereof! rendered services for adversary party,
who, with knowledge or acquiescence, accepted
them and received the "benefit" of them and
repudiated the contract, he may recover on
quantum meruit the reasonable value thereof.

Part performance.
In a_n action to quiet title to real property
wherem the defense was that defendant was in
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Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404,
125 P. 860, 1916D L.R.A. 892 (1912). But see
Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772, 20
A.L.R. 280 (1921).
Revocation or release of agreement to answer for debt of another.
The release or revocation of an agreement to
answer for the debt of another must be in writing. Strevell-Patterson Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d
741 (Utah 1982).
Stipulation.
A stipulation to a divorce decree, reached between one of the parties and both counsel,

while the other party remained silent while it
was discussed and read into the record, was not
binding; agreement by the parties must be evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy
the statute of frauds, or the agreement must be
stated in court on the record before a judge.
Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Unilateral contracts.
Promises in unilateral contracts are not
within the statute of frauds, no matter how
long the time for performance may take.
Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376
(Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds §§ 7-43, 179-273.
C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of
§§ 4-67.

25-5-5. Representation

Key Numbers. 1-54½.

Frauds, Statute of

e=>

as to credit of third person.

To charge a person upon a representation as to the credit of a third person,
such representation, or some memorandum thereof, must be in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2468;
C.L. 1917, § 5818; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds §§ 172-178.

Key Numbers. 37-42.

Frauds, Statute

of

e,,

25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another
When not required to be in writing.
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in any of the following
cases is deemed an original obligation of the promisor and need not be in
writing:
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has received property of
another upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by
one who has received a discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in
consideration of such promise.
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters into an obligation in
consideration of the obligation in respect to which the promise is made in
terms or under circumstances such as to render the party making the
promise the principal debtor and the person in whose behalf it is made his
surety.
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is
made upon the consideration that the party receiving it cancel the ante-
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cedent obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or
upon the consideration that the party receiving it releases the property of
another from a levy or his person from imprisonment under an execution
on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either party to
the antecedent obligation or from another person.
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commission to sell merchandise
and to guarantee the sale.
(5) When the holder of an instrument for the payment of money upon
which a third person is or may become liable to him transfers it in payment of a precedent debt of his own, or for a new consideration, and in
connection with such transfer enters into a promise respecting such instrument.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2471;
C.L. 1917, § 5819; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction and application.
Bank's promise to repurchase a particular
note which it had discounted with another
bank was not within this statute, since, in so
repurchasing, bank would only be carrying out
the original agreement made by it without regard to any third party's interest. Jenkins v.

Nicolas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177 (1924).
Cause of action against a corporation upon a
promissory note came within Subsection (1) of
this section and was not barred by § 25-5-4(2).
Kahn v. Perry Zolezze, Inc., 119 Utah 256, 226
P.2d 118 (1950).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds §§ 179-265.

Key Numbers. et seq.

Frauds, Statute of e=> 13

25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to be contracts in writing, and
all communications sent by telegraph and signed by the person sending the
same, or by his authority, shall be deemed to be communications in writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2472;
C.L. 1917, § 5820; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agent authorization.
Agent could sign contract to purchase property for husband, who sent telegram authoriz-

ing agent to accept the offer, but not for the
wife, who was joint tenant. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds §§ 300.
Key Numbers. - Frauds, Statute of e=> 117.

18

25-5-8

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

25-5-8. Right to specific performance

not affected.

Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers
of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part
performance thereof.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2477;
C.L. 1917, § 5824; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
tract. This possession must be established
without qualification or doubt. Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915).
Merely making improvements will not alone
take an oral contract out of the statute of
frauds. Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290,279 P. 502
(1929).
The doctrine of part performance is to be applied with great care, paying particular attention to the policy expressed in the statute of
frauds and historical precedent where the
limits have been defined by the process of inclusion and exclusion. It is not intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only to prevent
its being made the means of perpetrating a
fraud. In order that a person may be permitted
to give evidence of a contract not in writing,
and which is in the very teeth of the statute,
and a nullity at law, it is essential that he establish in equity by clear and positive proof,
acts and things done in pursuance and on account thereof, exclusively referable thereto,
and which take it out of the operation of the
statute. Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260
P.2d 570 (1953).
Where the existence of the oral contract is
established by an admission of the party resisting specific performance or by competent evidence independent of the acts of part performance, the requirement that the acts of part
performance must be exclusively referable to
the oral contract is satisfied. In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 278 (1954).
Purchaser of land under an oral contract
seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under the
doctrine of part performance, based upon his
possession of the land and improvements
thereon, must establish that the possession
was actual, open, exclusive and with the
seller's consent; improvements made were substantial, valuable and beneficial; a valuable
consideration was given in exchange for the
conveyance; and all of the foregoing was exclusively referable to the contract. Coleman v.
Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981).
To meet the part performance exception to
the statute of frauds, the terms of the oral contract must be established by clear and definite

ANALYSIS

Estoppel.
Husband and wife.
Part performance.
-In general.
-Established.
-Not established.
Specific performance.
Estoppel.
Where prospective purchaser wished to buy
property from the defendant and defendant
said that he would sign a contract for the sale
of the property but he did not do so, no estoppel
in pais was established. Under the facts the
plaintiff could not make a case of equitable estoppel since the oral representations of the defendant that he would complete the negotiations constituted nothing more than a promise
as to future conduct, not a representation as to
a material and existing fact nor the expression
of an intent to abandon an existing right.
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570
(1953).
An estoppel will not arise simply because of
a breach of promise as to future conduct or because of a disappointment of expectations on
an executory agreement. Ravarino v. Price,
123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953).

Husband and wife.
Finding that husband and wife had orally
agreed to deliver marketable title of land to
plaintiff was not supported by the evidence,
since wife had never been consulted about the
matter at all, and there was no evidence that
she had agreed to anything. Holmgren Bros. v.
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975).
Part performance.

-In general.
If plaintiff relies upon a parol contract of
sale, the first essential is to establish the contract by competent evidence. In order to make
possession available as part performance, it
must appear that it was given or taken in pursuance of a parol contract proven; such possession must be notorious, exclusive, and of the
very tract of land which was subject of the con-
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testimony. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74
(Utah 1982).

-Established.
Oral contract by decedent to make a will
leaving property to plaintiff in consideration of
services to be rendered was enforceable where
plaintiff rendered such services as he was
called upon to perform under the contract up to
the time of the death of the deceased, and during which time he was in possession of the
property by arrangement made by the deceased. Van Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376,
195 P. 192 (1920).
Where there was no memorandum reduced
to writing or no writing subscribed by the parties to be charged, but the deceased had accepted the consideration and surrendered possession, there was sufficient part performance
to avoid the statute of frauds, and the deceased's heirs and successors in title and interest were not entitled to repudiate the contract.
In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327,259 P.2d
595 (1953).
Part performance was established where it
was shown that the defendant had moved onto
the property, made improvements and paid
half of the purchase price and had tendered the
remaining purchase price to the plaintiff. In re
Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 278
(1954).
Where plaintiff moved from another city and
took care of the business and personal affairs of
the decedent, there was sufficient part performance to warrant the granting of specific performance of an oral contract to bequeath stock
and real property. Randall v. Tracy Collins
Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956).
Buyers who proceeded with performance for
twelve years under oral contract for sale of realty (paying all but $49 of down payment, paying sellers' mortgage payments which covered
taxes and insurance, discharging special improvement assessment and making improvements to the property) established sufficient
performance to remove contract from statute of
frauds and entitle them to specific performance. Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (Utah
1975).
Evidence was sufficient to establish part performance of an oral contract for the sale of land
so as to remove the statute of frauds as a bar to
such contract and entitle vendee to specific performance where vendee, who was a cotenant
with vendor, made improvements whose value
far exceeded the rental value of the property
and were not such improvements that would be

made by a tenant in the ordinary use of the
premises; vendee paid a valuable consideration
to vendor for the property; vendee's possession
of the property was open and known to vendor
and not without vendor's consent; and vendee's
improvements, consideration and possession
were exclusively referable to the contract.
Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54 (Utah 1980).

-Not established.
The doctrine of part performance does not
apply where the act relied upon is the purchase
of a strip of land adjoining that of the defendant and to be used in conjunction with the
land that the defendant orally promised to convey. Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d
570 (1953).
Weeding and discing land with the consent
of owner, prior to payment of consideration,
was not such substantial improvement to the
land that compensation could not be made for
the labor, and was not sufficient part performance to remove oral contract for sale of land
from the statute of frauds. Holmgren Bros. v.
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975).
Deposit of check payable to bank, to be held
by bank until title was cleared and deed recorded, was not sufficient part performance to
remove oral contract for sale of land from the
statute of frauds. Holmgren Bros. v. Ballard,
534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975).
Where a rancher worked long hours over a
period of years for employer and declined other
offers of employment, his service did not constitute "exclusively referable acts" of reliance on
a disputed oral agreement on the part of the
employer to convey 120 acres of land, and thus
there was not sufficient part performance to
take the case out of the statute of frauds. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983).
Specific performance.
Where party seeks specific performance of a
parol contract in equity, he must establish the
terms thereof with a greater degree of certainty than would be required to establish the
same contract in an action at law. Montgomery
v. Berrett, 40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569 (1912).
An action to collect money due under a contract is not an action in specific performance.
Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d
282 (1942).
Plaintiffs who had made a down payment,
had completed mortgage payments, and had
paid a special curb and gutter assessment pursuant to an oral contract for the purchase of
realty were entitled to specific performance.
Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - The Doctrine of Part
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 91.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance §§ 19, 20.

C.J.S. -

§§ 44, 45.

81 C.J.S. Specific Performance

Key Numbers. 39 et seq.

Specific Performance """

25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal.
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter to be subscribed
by any party may be subscribed by the lawful agent of such party.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2478;
C.L. 1917, § 5825; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
nor given written authority to agent to sign for
her. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah
1986).

Authorization from only one joint tenant.
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint
tenant, by contract to purchase the common
property since she had not signed the contract

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds § 379 et seq.

Key Numbers. 116(1).

Frauds, Statute of

®"'

CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-2.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-6.

Section
25-6-7.
25-6-8.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-11.

Transfer - When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief - Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to chapter.
25-6-12. Construction of chapter.
25-6-13. Applicability of chapter.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value - Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer - Claim arising before or after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer - Claim arising before transfer.

25-6-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 1; recompiled as C. 1953,

Transfer Act."

Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.
Compiler's Notes. - This chapter was enacted as §§ 25A-1-1 to 25A-l-13; it has been
renumbered and all internal references corrected accordingly under instruction from the

25-6-1.

Comparable Provisions. - Other jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act include: Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota,
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Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. - Uniform Commercial
Code - Sales, § 70A-2-101 et seq.

Uniform Commercial Code - Bulk Transfers, § 70A-6-101 et seq.
Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor,
§ 76-6-511.
Statute of limitations, § 78-12-26(3).

25-6-2. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with
power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the
debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to
vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the
power to vote;
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to
vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding
voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the
securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the
power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease
or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are
controlled by the debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or
other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the
extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against
only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.
(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if the debtor is an individual:
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
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(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(a)(ii); or
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or
person in control;
(b) if the debtor is a corporation:
(i) a director of the debtor;
(ii) an officer of the debtor;
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(b)(iv); or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person
in control of the debtor;
(c) if the debtor is a partnership:
(i) a general partner in the debtor;
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a
person in control of the debtor;
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7){c)(iii); or
(v) a person in control of the debtor;
{d) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were
the debtor; and
{e) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security
interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency,
business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a
spouse, related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined
by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release,
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a
judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 2; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-2.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ality so as to reach all artifices and evasions
designed to rob the act of its full force and effect in preventing debtors from paying the just
claims of their creditors. Butler v. Wilkinson,
740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Creditors.
Construction and application.
Intent.
Creditors.
Persons having claim in tort against grantor
which was not reduced to judgment at time of
alleged fraudulent conveyance held "creditor"
within meaning of this section. Zuniga v.
Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 513, 101 A.L.R.
532 (1935).

Intent.
Where debtors engaged in a Ponzi scheme,
the debtors' fraudulent intent was established
as a matter of law, notwithstanding the bankruptcy trustee's burden of proving each element of a fraudulent conveyance by clear and
convincing evidence under this chapter. Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing
House Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987).

Construction and application.
This section should be construed with liber-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - The Bankrupt's
Spouse: The Forgotten Character in the Bankruptcy Drama, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 709, 722.
A.L.R.- Future tort, conveyance as fraudulent where made in contemplation of possible
liability for, 38 A.L.R.3d 597.
Rule denying recovery of property to one who
conveyed to defraud creditors as applicable
where the claim which motivated the conveyance was never established, 6 A.L.R.4th 862.

Right of secured creditor to have set aside
fraudulent transfer of other property by his
debtor, 8 A.L.R.4th 1123.
Conspiracy, right of creditor to recover damages for conspiracy to defraud him of claim, 11
A.L.R.4th 345.
Key Numbers. - Fraudulent Conveyances
-5.

25-6-3. Insolvency.
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all
of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation.
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is
presumed to be insolvent.
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the
partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each general
partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership debts.
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under
this chapter.
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is
secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as an asset.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 3; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-3.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Allegation of insolvency.
Determination of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient
as against contention that it was a conclusion.
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 513, 101
A.L.R. 532 (1935).
Determination of insolvency.
The determination of insolvency under this
section is not the same as the determination of

insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as this section requires merely a showing that the party's
assets are not sufficient to meet liabilities as
they become due. Meyer v. General Am. Corp.,
569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).
In an action by a creditor to set aside an
allegedly fraudulent conveyance of real estate
by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate
that the debtor was insolvent where the only
evidence was that the debtor submitted two
checks that were returned unpaid. Furniture
Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398
(Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Fraudulent Conveyances

A.L.R. - Imputation of insolvency as defamatory, 49 A.L.R.3d 163.

25-6-4. Value -

41=>57(1).

Transfer.

(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support
to the debtor or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives areasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact
substantially contemporaneous.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-4.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer - Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
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(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they
became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may
be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor
had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(0 the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
History: C. 1953, 25A-l-5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-5.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59

became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. - Defrauding creditors
as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or was made for such
purpose, depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, as gathered from the badges of fraud present.
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063
(1942).

ANALYSIS

Assignments.
Badges of fraud.
Construction and application.
Constructive trust.
Conveyances between relatives.
Evidence.
Fair consideration.
"Good faith" transfer.
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Parent and child.
Assignments.
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, unaccompanied by change of possession, is fraudulent per se as to execution creditors of, or subsequent purchasers from, seller or assignor
does not necessarily apply to assignments for
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking
possession is circumstance from which fraud
may be prima facie inferred. Snyder v. Murdock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899).

Badges of fraud.
Although actual fraudulent intent must be
shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its existence may be inferred from the presence of
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud."
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
(Utah 1986).
"Badges of fraud," from which actual intent
may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtor's
(1) continuing in possession and evidencing the
prerequisites of property ownership after having formally conveyed all his interest in the
property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipa-
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tion of litigation, and (3) making a conveyance
to a family member without receiving fair consideration. Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726
P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).

Construction and application.
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor
from paying or securing his honest debts, or
from doing equity and exact justice to all of his
creditors by placing his means at their disposal. Billings v. Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P.
730 (1898).
Constructive trust.
A constructive trust was properly imposed to
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land,
which were in excess of the purchase price, had
been paid into court, and a subsequent conveyance to a third-party purchaser for value without notice could not be voided. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Conveyances between relatives.
Conveyances between near relatives, calculated to prevent a creditor from realizing on his
claim against one of such relatives, are subject
to rigid scrutiny. Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah
540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932).
The mere fact that the transaction is among
close relatives does not necessarily mean that
it is invalid, but the true facts are subject to
proof. Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351
P.2d 959 (1960).
A note and mortgage executed by son in good
faith to secure a preexisting obligation which
the son owed his father was not a fraudulent
conveyance. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Conveyances between close relatives are
subject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that close
relatives are involved does not render the conveyance fraudulent. Ned J. Bowman Co. v.
White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Evidence.
Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, delay or defraud creditors depends upon the facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction, as gathered from the badges of fraud
present. Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126
P.2d 1063 (1942).
In an action on notes executed by the defendants and to establish a lien on property conveyed by one of the defendants to his children,
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the lower
court's findings that the conveyances were not
fraudulent and to sustain a judgment denying
a lien. Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,351
P.2d 959 (1960).
Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to
creditors must be determined from the facts of
each case and from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, keeping in mind that
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the purpose of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(now see the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act) is not to prevent a debtor from securing
his honest debt. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White,
13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Fair consideration.
Where there is a valuable consideration
which is stated to be fair, equivalent for, and
not disproportionate to the value of the property conveyed, the requirement as to allegations and proof of fraud is more exacting.
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264
(1932).
Where wife owned a substantial interest in a
joint bank account and husband executed a
note to the wife at her request upon withdrawing a substantial sum from such account to invest in a hazardous business, and when it became due, husband executed renewal note secured by mortgage on undivided one-half interest in property owned by them jointly, the original interest note was supported by valuable
consideration, and, hence, the mortgage was
not fraudulent as to creditors. Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674 (1935).
Conveyance of property worth $14,000 to
$15,000, which netted only about $180 a year,
to party in satisfaction of preexisting debt of
$10,000 was not a fraudulent conveyance.
Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92
Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738 (1937).
A debt barred by the statute of limitations
may nevertheless be consideration for the assignment of an interest in an estate, even as
between close relatives. Boccalero v. Bee, 102
Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942).
In suit to set aside conveyance from husband
to wife, no actual fraudulent intent will be required, when there was no fair value or consideration given, and the effect of the transfer is
to render the grantor insolvent. Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 560, 151 P.2d 99, 154 A.L.R. 906
(1944).
A conveyance was not made in good faith,
and there was a failure of fair consideration,
where purchaser knew that the purchase price
of an item was approximately only one-tenth
the value of the item. Meyer v. General Am.
Corp., 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).
Satisfaction of an obligation owed the transferee by a third party did not qualify as fair
§ 25-1-4.
consideration
under
former
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
(Utah 1986).
An otherwise fraudulent transfer is not
made nonfraudulent because transfer is made
to satisfy a third party's obligation to the
transferee even if the thirty party is a corporation set up by the transferor. Dahnken, Inc. v.
Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).
"Good faith" transfer.
Proof that a transferee of property knows
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that the transferor-debtor has preferred the
transferee over other creditors or that the
transferee actively sought the preference from
the debtor does not support the conclusion that
the transferee lacks good faith under former
§ 25-1-7. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244
(Utah 1987).
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Mortgage on stock of merchandise was
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of mortgagor, where mortgagor remained in possession of mortgaged property and continued to
sell it in usual course of business pursuant to
merely verbal agreement with mortgagee,
which agreement contemplated that mortgage

was not to be paid on its due date but was to be
extended from time to time. McKibbon v. Brigham, 18 Utah 78, 55 P. 66 (1898).

Parent and child.
Labor performed for parents by children during their minority will not entitle such children to compensation, so as to establish relation of debtor and creditor and permit parents
lawfully to prefer children, convey their property to them, and thus place property out of
reach of parents' creditors whose claims were
in existence at time of deed's execution. Ogden
State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P. 765
(1895).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Future tort, conveyance as fraudulent where made in contemplation of possible
liability for, 38 A.L.R.3d 597.

Key Numbers. - Fraudulent Conveyances

e=- 24(2), 71, 76(1).

25-6-6. Fraudulent transfer - Claim arising before transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if:
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at the time; or
(b) the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim
arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for
an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-6, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 6; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-6.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Mortgage.
A mortgage made without fair consideration,
which will render the person making it insolvent, constitutes statutory fraud, and the exis-

tence of a subjective intention to defraud is not
required. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Key Numbers. - Fraudulent Conveyances

e=- 74(1).
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25-6-7. Transfer -

25-6-8

When made.

In this chapter:
(1) A transfer is made:
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected
that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against
whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the
transferee; and
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a
fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien other than under this
chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in
Subsection (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed
made immediately before the commencement of the action.
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as
provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective
between the debtor and the transferee.
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the
asset transferred.
(5) An obligation is incurred:
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the
obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-7, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 7; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-7.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59

became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. - Secured transactions,
Chapter 9 of Title 70A.

25-6-8. Remedies of creditors.
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to
satisfy the creditor's claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with
applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its
proceeds.
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History: C. 1953, 25A-l-8, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 8; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-8.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Garnishment proceeding.
Pleadings.
Presumptions and burden of proof.
Garnishment proceeding.
Fact that pleadings in garnishment proceedings revealed that indebtedness sued upon was
that of individuals and that those individuals
had no account with garnishee bank, the only
account being with corporation owned by individuals, did not make cause of action one, under this section, to set aside conveyance, and
thus argument that court had never obtained
jurisdiction of corporate defendant or of res
since no service of summons was made upon
corporation could not be maintained; the pleading sufficiently averred a sham transaction between the individuals and the corporation so
that they should be considered as identical for
purpose of garnishment proceedings. Stine v.
Girola, 9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959).
Transfer of stock could be set aside as a
fraudulent conveyance on motion in garnishment proceeding, and it was not necessary to
file a separate action to obtain such relief.
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423,519 P.2d 236
(1974).
Pleadings.
Allegations in an action to set aside convey-

ances that the conveyances were made for the
purpose of placing the property beyond the
reach of creditors and were made as part of a
scheme, without a statement of the facts from
which the purpose could be inferred, and without stating facts constituting the scheme,
amounted to no more than the mere statement
that the conveyances were fraudulent. Smith
v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932).
Complaint in an action to set aside a conveyance was not objectionable for failure to allege
that the property involved in the conveyance
was not exempt. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,
48 P.2d 513, 101 A.L.R. 532 (1935).
Presumptions and burden of proof.
Where grantees were in possession of premises pursuant to a duly recorded deed and were
paying taxes thereon, it was incumbent upon
plaintiffs, in an action to set aside conveyance,
to allege and prove that grantees as such did
certain acts held themselves out in a way that
misled plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had knowledge and relied thereon. Smith v. Edwards, 81
Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932).
Burden of proof is not on plaintiff to show
that property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed is not exempt from execution.
Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 560, 151 P.2d 99,
154 A.L.R. 906 (1944).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Fraudulent Conveyances
226 et seq.

<11=>
217,

25-6-9. Good faith transfer.
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a)
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value
or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-B(l)(a), the creditor
may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the
transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who
took for value or from any subsequent transferee.
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset
transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the
30

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

25-6-9

asset at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may
require.
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this
chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the
value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to:
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(b) or Section
25-6-6 if the transfer results from:
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Chapter 9,
Title 70A, the Uniform Commercial Code.
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2):
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a
valid lien;
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the insider; or
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and
the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an
antecedent debt of the debtor.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-9, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 9; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-9.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land,
which were in excess of the purchase price, had
been paid into court, and a subsequent conveyance to a third-party purchaser for value without notice could not be voided. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Consideration.
Constructive trust.
Good faith.
Previous notice of fraud.
Purchaser.

Good faith.
A conveyance will fail for lack of "fair consideration" if the party seeking to avoid the
conveyance can show that the transferee did
not take "in good faith." Merrill v. Abbott (In
re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr.
843 (D. Utah 1987).

Consideration.
The term "consideration" as used in former
§ 25-1-13 includes both a conveyance of "property" and satisfaction of an antecedent debt.
Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing
House Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987).
An investor in a Ponzi scheme gave "valuable consideration" for the transfers he received to the extent the transfers did not exceed his undertaking, but did not give valuable
consideration for a transfer to the extent the
transfer exceeded the amount of his undertaking. Therefore, for such transfers, former
§ 25-1-13 was no defense. Merrill v. Abbott (In
re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr.
843 (D. Utah 1987).

Previous notice of fraud.
The mere fact that an investment promises
to pay a high rate of return may not, without
more, put one on notice that it is fraudulent.
Therefore, that fact alone may not mean that
the investors in a Ponzi scheme had previous
notice of the debtors' fraud, especially when
the debtors actually paid the promised returns
until the scheme collapsed. Merrill v. Abbott
(In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77
Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987).

Constructive trust.
A constructive trust was properly imposed to
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds
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property through a voluntary transfer. Merrill
v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing House
Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987).

Purchaser.
The term "purchaser" as used in former
§ 25-1-13 includes anyone who acquires title to

COLLATERAL
REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Fraudulent Conveyances

41=>192.

25-6-10. Claim for relief -

Time limits.

A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent transfer or
obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought:
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a), within four years after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred or, iflater, within one year after
the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered
by the claimant;
{2) under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(b) or 25-6-6(1), within four years after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-10, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 10; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-10.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles oflaw and equity, including
merchant law and the law relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, !aches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement this chapter's provisions.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-ll, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 11; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-11.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25-6-12. Construction of chapter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among
states enacting it.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-12, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 12; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-12.
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Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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25-6-13. Applicability

25-6-13

of chapter.

This act applies when any transfer occurs after the effective date of this act.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-13, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 13; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-13.
Compiler's Notes. - The term "this act"
means Laws 1988, Chapter 59, which appears
as §§ 25-6-1 to 25-6-13, 78-12-25, and
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78-12-29, and which was effective April 25,
1988. The reference probably should be to "this
chapter."
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

